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A n d r e a J o n e s - R o o y a n d S c o t t E . P a g e
The Complexities of Global
Systems History∗
Only connect! That was the whole of her sermon. Only connect the
prose and the passion and both will be exalted, and human love will
be seen at its height. Live in fragments no longer.
—E.M. Forster
Introduction
WE LIVE IN a complex world. Each of us adapts in response to the actions
of those connected to us to produce emergent aggregate phenomena: cities
expand and contract, social groups form and dissolve, and things we enjoy
(money, oil, good company, fine wine) wax and wane in availability over
time. Our interactions produce phenomena in multiple domains—diseases
spread over our social networks, species with whom we share our environ-
ment become extinct, and wars break out across our borders.
Increased connectedness has led to greater cooperation. In less than half
a century, Europe transitioned out of centuries of bloodshed over national
borders into a region of unprecedented international cooperation. Connect-
edness has also led to more competition. Ideas thought up in San Francisco
today can be turned into products in Kunming, China, tomorrow.
∗We thank Peter Coclanis and Bryant Simon for helpful comments. Contact ajonrooy@
umich.edu or spage@umich.edu.
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No single event tipped Europe into a zone of cooperation, yet we believe it
was not purely an accident, either. We want to explain outcomes, to predict
what is coming, and, in light of the many challenges facing the entire globe—
terrorism, climate change, poverty, deforestation, financial collapse, and
more—we also want to be able to change things. Standard tools of analysis
that focus on equilibrium outcomes—snapshots of the world at particular
moments—have gotten us far in our efforts to understand our world. But
we can go further in our understanding. As Professor Alan Wood writes
in “Fire, Water, Earth, and Sky,” complex systems thinking about global
history can help us get there.1
Global systems history characterizes the world as a complex system, with
diverse, connected, interdependent parts whose actions have global impact.
Whereas much of previous history, whether of the French Revolution or the
Crimean War, could be identified geographically, much of the history of
the present day (the Green Revolution, the War on Terrorism) transcends
place. Cities, states, and nations may still be the pieces on the chessboard,
but their local interactions, through the genius of modern technology, now
have global impacts.
Saying that something, be it human history or the ecology of a small pond,
is a complex system has implications for what we expect to transpire—and
for how we explain what’s already there. In a global system outcomes won’t
all just be one damn thing after another. Nor will they all be mechanistic
and linear. Outcomes could be either, or they may lie in between, forming
emergent, dynamic patterns, of which we can explain and possibly predict
parts, if not the whole. As historians have long recognized, it is rare that we
can identify one event as having been caused by just one other. Rather, it is
a collection of interacting parts—actors in a system—affecting and reacting
to each other that causes new events.
The word systemic, and its cousin holistic, implies a form of closure. A
systems approach closes loops. It recognizes that toxic chemicals dumped
into waterways accumulate in the flesh of fish and eventually enter our
1Alan T. Wood, “Fire, Water, Earth, and Sky: Global Systems History and the Human
Prospect,” Journal of the Historical Society 10:3 (September 2010): 287–318.
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bloodstreams. This way of looking at the world echoes the emphasis on
unity and connection between all things that characterizes much of Eastern
philosophy. It can also, if one takes an optimistic enough view, translate
into a hope that we will be able to think through the logical steps and
attain a more perfect, more cooperative future. Applied to history, complex
systems thinking may be folded into existing methods of analysis that already
appreciate both the ambiguity and the richness that result from thinking
about multiple causes and conditionality.
In this paper we comment on Wood’s approach to global systems history
from the perspective of complexologists. We make five main points. We
first offer up some general comments about the difference between systems
and complex systems. Not all systems produce complexity. In addition,
regardless of whether a system produces complex phenomena, it may be
subject to laws that make some outcomes unavoidable. Understanding does
not necessarily mean freedom from helplessness. Even if we fully understand
how a complex system functions, we may not be able to do much about the
outcomes it produces. But that may be too hopeful a perspective, anyway.
Often complex systems generate outcomes that are unexpected and even
emergent.2
Second, we distinguish between the attributes of complex systems and
the types of outcomes that they produce. In so doing, we emphasize that
not all complex systems produce outcomes that are “good.” True, complex
systems can produce emergent cooperative regimes, but they’re also capable
of self-organized criticality. By this we mean they can self-configure to states
that produce large events—financial crises, epidemics, and wars. We also
discuss what exactly is meant by complexity. Surprisingly, for all the work
on complexity, we often have a clearer idea of what complexity is not than
of what it is.
The fact that complex systems produce emergence—the possibility of un-
expected and unpredictable outcomes, not all of which will be good—has
2Emergence is another concept that tends to defy definition. We refer to emergence as the
production of new, unexpected, and usually unpredictable outcomes from parts that look quite
unlike the resulting whole. See John H. Holland, Emergence: From Chaos to Order (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
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important policy implications. From the perspective of complex systems
thinking, it no longer makes a lot of sense to have as a policy goal a “good
outcome,” as there is no guarantee we can generate it in the first place, much
less preserve it if it is reached. Instead, the implication is that we ought to
think about how to design systems so that they are less likely to generate or
tip into undesirable outcomes. We’d like systems that are robust in the face
of large events, but that also produce fewer such events in the first place. If
we want to explain events that have already taken place, complex systems
thinking suggests we ought to be prepared for the possibility that our causes
may look very, very different from our effects.
Third, we focus on just one particular aspect of complex systems to illus-
trate how close study of even just part of a complex system yields insights
that can offer a lot of traction in understanding social, ecological, and phys-
ical outcomes. We select connectedness, specifically networks, and examine
their logic, structure, and function. It turns out that not only is understand-
ing each element of a network useful, but also understanding one element
(e.g., structure) helps us say things about another (e.g., function).
We then turn to the big “so what?” If the world is complex, why does
it matter? Here we agree strongly with Wood that it means we need more
global thinking. More specifically, it means that the adage “think glob-
ally, act locally” should be reframed as “act locally with an eye toward
global consequences.”3 Our long-term viability may well depend on such
an approach, but does it mean that by adopting such a mindset, we should
expect outcomes in the political, economic, and social realms to be robust,
beautiful, efficient, and fair?
Here we take a less sanguine view than Wood. Even if we do learn to
“harness” complexity, we must keep in mind that even our best results
won’t always be pretty.4 The best of all possible complex worlds are messy
and inefficient. We need look no further than ecosystems, which, for all
their decentralization and bottom-up activity, suffer plenty of undesirable
3Or from a policy perspective, perhaps, “get people to act locally in ways that can improve
what happens globally”—but that might be stretching it.
4On harnessing complexity, see Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Com-
plexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier (New York: Free Press, 2000).
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processes and outcomes. To be sure, political systems are also perfectly
capable of producing outcomes like war, ethnic conflict, and the collapse of
nation-states.5
Finally, we cannot forget the tradeoff between exploration (looking for
new solutions) and exploitation (using existing ones) within complex sys-
tems.6 Too much exploration and outcomes suffer, but too much exploita-
tion sacrifices robustness. If we accept the complexity paradigm, we must
accept the frictions brought about by experimentation and testing of the
status quo. We need to keep disagreeing. The balance between yin and yang
will not be one of equilibrium, but one of churning.
Systems, Complex Systems
In this essay, we distinguish between systems thinking and complex sys-
tems thinking. Systems thinking refers to a way of understanding the world
by considering the whole, i.e., by considering the parts as well as how they
are connected. For example, a non-systems thinker might believe that by
increasing the penalties for speeding on highways, fewer people will exceed
the speed limit. A systems thinker will recognize that if fewer people speed,
then the police will be less inclined to monitor highways and will focus their
limited resources elsewhere. This reduced police presence will decrease the
likelihood that a speeder gets caught and will create an incentive for people to
drive faster. The direct effect—the higher penalty—and the indirect effect—
the lower probability of receiving a ticket—may well balance out and have
little or no impact on the number of motorists exceeding the speed limit.
This simple example is important because it drives home (no pun intended)
a key point. A system may include feedbacks and interdependencies, but that
does not mean that it produces complex outcomes. Initially, the system had
an equilibrium number of speeders, and after the penalty was increased, it
5For two collections of examples of complex systems models that produce these phenomena,
see Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Ian S. Lustick, “Agent-Based Modelling of
Collective Identity: Testing Constructivist Theory,” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social
Simulation 3:1 (2000).
6For the seminal work on the exploration/exploitation tradeoff, see James C. March, “Ex-
ploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,” Organization Science 2:1 (1991):
71–87.
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had a new equilibrium number of speeders that was slightly lower than the
initial number. This outcome is not a particularly complex one.
What do we mean by that? What makes an outcome complex? Stephen
Wolfram characterizes four types of outcomes of systems: equilibrium,
cycles, complexity, and chaos.7 Each of these could be associated with a
way of seeing the world. Some of us—economists, for example—may tend
to look for equilibria: snapshots of outcomes poised in balance like a mod-
ern art installation of hinges and levers. Others might notice cycles or other
repeating patterns over history. After all, we do tend to repeat ourselves over
time, both in our personal habits and in our behavior as groups.8 Finally,
the cynics among us may believe that all of this is just chaotic.
Complexologists locate themselves in the middle: the world may not be
perfectly predictable or repeating, but it is also not completely unpredictable
or unintelligible. Instead, interactions between parts can give rise to a kind of
order—what John Holland calls “hidden order.”9 Sometimes we see patterns
that give way to large events. Other times we might observe exponential
growth followed by stasis. We might see it coming, or we might be surprised,
but we always see it as worth trying to understand.
The connectedness and interdependencies in complex systems contribute
to their unpredictability. We cannot separate a complex system into simple
parts, analyze the effects of those parts independently, and then combine
them to discern the aggregate effect.10 In systems with only two parts or
actors, be they entities in a physical system or strategic players in a game
theory model, mathematicians can deduce closed form solutions using mech-
anistic arguments. In systems with millions of parts or actors, such as a gas
or a simplistic model of an economy, it is possible to use statistics and
7Stephen Wolfram, A New Kind of Science (Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media, 2002).
8For psychological evidence of habits see Wendy Wood and David T. Neal, “A New Look
at Habits and the Habit-Goal Interface,” Psychological Review 114:4 (2007): 843–863. Note
also that policymakers might be somewhere in between equilibrium and cyclical worldviews:
they might imagine the world as a machine with multiple levers that generates a patterned
outcome. Change the pressure on one of the levers, and you change the outcome.
9John H. Holland, Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity (New York: Helix
Books, 1995).
10See Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1998).
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statistical mechanics to derive limiting distributions. Complex systems lie
between mechanistic small number problems and probabilistic large num-
ber problems.11 We have the mathematics to solve both very simple systems
and systems with large numbers of independent entities, but we lack the
mathematics to characterize complex systems.
Complex Systems: Attributes and Outcomes
Wood identifies five concepts as characteristics of systems theory that
yield synergy when applied to global history. They are emergence, feedback,
interconnectivity, self-organization, and cooperation. While all five concepts
are related to complex systems, we suggest it is useful to make a distinction
between those that are attributes of complex systems, and those that are
outcomes of complex systems. Feedback and connectivity are attributes—
they are things that make a complex system complex. Cooperation and
self-organization, on the other hand, are phenomena that can be produced






Given this attributional approach to definition, an ecosystem, an economy,
and a political system would be complex, but a subwoofer would not. The
subwoofer has parts, but they don’t adapt in interesting ways. Therefore, the
subwoofer is complicated, but not complex. Note also that the performance
of the subwoofer, at least one hopes, is also predictable. Turn the bass
dial from four to six and the bass level increases in a linear fashion. This
predictability need not hold for a complex system: a few more kilotons of
carbon in the atmosphere or a few hundred more defaults on mortgages can
cause a system to shift from stable to cataclysmic.
11See, e.g., Gerald Weinberg, An Introduction to General Systems Theory (New York: Wiley,
1975), and also see Warren Weaver, “Science and Complexity,” American Scientist 36 (1948):
537–544.
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All of the above attributes must be present in a system in order for it to be
complex. A system of connected, interacting, and adaptive identical agents
will not give rise to outcomes we associate with complex systems, and neither
will a system of diverse agents that are adaptive but never interact meaning-
fully with one another. All four attributes must be present in order for com-
plex systems to generate phenomena that are of interest, such as emergence.
As Wood points out, complex systems are capable of producing much
more than just emergence. Below is a (nonexhaustive) list of some major










The range of possible behaviors produced by complex systems is unimagin-
ably large. To say that they can produce linear or nonlinear effects under-
states the vastness of possibilities. To wit, John Von Neumann, one of the
founders of complexity theory, once referred to the study of nonlinear func-
tions as akin to the study of nonelephants. Despite this breadth of outcomes,
we should keep in mind that complex systems are subject to mathematical
and physical constraints. If the entities within a complex system are subject
to selective pressures, then those entities will be subject to efficiency con-
straints. Efficiency may then drive the emergent order we see. For example,
West, Brown, and Enquist explain power law relationships across a host of
biological phenomena (heart rates, white matter to gray matter ratios, etc.)
based on efficiency arguments.12
12Geoffrey West, James H. Brown, and Brian J. Enquist, “A General Model for the Origin
of Allometric Scaling Laws in Biology,” Science 276 (1997): 122–26.
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This research in no way contradicts the findings by Wolfram, Kauffman,
and others who show that even extremely simple models and rules can
generate emergent order, patterns, and computation.13 The Wolfram and
Kauffman models are stylized models that demonstrate the potential for
simple systems of interacting parts to produce complex phenomena. West
et al. show that in the real world, the ability to compute evolved in such a
way that the solution satisfies efficiency constraints. In this case, the amount
of white matter (connections) and gray matter (processors) must satisfy a
certain relationship.
Overall, complex systems can produce a variety of types of outcomes,
some of which we can understand, some of which we can affect, and some
of which we can neither comprehend nor manipulate.14 We will discuss
some of these—large events, robustness, cooperation, etc.—in more detail
in the next section. Before we can move on, though, we must focus on what
is still left unsaid: namely, what the heck is complexity? Complexity has an
abundance of definitions, which, like Whitman, sometimes contradict them-
selves owing to largeness. As mentioned, there exist even more definitions
of what complexity is not (random, chaotic, periodic, predictable, or static)
than what exactly it is.
To paint with a wide brush, we can distinguish between two primary types
of definitions that Page refers to as BOAR and DEEP.15
BOAR: Complexity lies between order and randomness.
DEEP: Complexity cannot be easily described, evolved, engineered, or pre-
dicted.
The DEEP definition is intuitive, but rather challenging in the details.
The BOAR approach requires some clarification. A system that produces
13Wolfram, A New Kind of Science; Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-
Organization and Selection in Evolution (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995). See also Stuart A. Kauffman, At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-
Organization and Complexity (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
14Jervis, System Effects.
15On BOAR and DEEP, see Scott E. Page, Diversity and Complexity (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, forthcoming, 2010). See also Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), for more on defining complexity.
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regular patterns or equilibria is not complex. It is ordered. One might think,
then, that complexity means a lack of order. That logic only extends so
far. If a system becomes random, then it is no longer complex. To see why,
we turn to the second definition. A random process is easily described and
engineered, and if it is stationary, then it is also easily predicted, at least
at the distribution level. A complex process cannot be easily described. It
produces an endless stream of structures and patterns that may or may not
be seen again.
In light of these definitions, we find Professor Wood’s position uncon-
troversial. We do live in a complex world. In fact, we go even further
and suggest that over the past one hundred years, the human experience
has become more complex. This is not to say we haven’t previously had
global effects (deforestation in medieval Europe affected the climate then,
too). Nor is it to say that individuals have necessarily become more so-
phisticated. That need not be the case. Systemic complexity depends less
on the characteristics of the components than on their connections and in-
terdependencies. A human brain, for example, is extremely complex, but
its parts—the neurons, axons, and dendrites—have fewer capabilities than
your average paramecium. Our modern complexity stems from the fact
that new technology allows our actions to influence and be influenced by
more people. And those interactions have meaningful, possibly immedi-
ate, repercussions at multiple levels. In the next section we consider just
that.
Networks: Logic, Structure, and Function
Rather than attempt a survey of all attributes of complex systems and
how they might produce the various outcomes we list above, we focus
here on a single attribute: connectedness. Our aim is to demonstrate how
careful analysis of just one attribute can earn us substantial mileage in terms
of understanding complex systems processes and outcomes, and how we
might do something to affect them. We hope to encourage historians to
embrace complexity theory, not just to employ it as a convenient collection
of metaphors and insights.
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Research in complex systems has begun to show how connectedness mat-
ters. How people, ideas, and species are connected influences how events
play out. One powerful example suffices to make this point. Models of epi-
demics that rely on mathematics used to assume random mixing of people.
This effectively assumes away any social structure. Random mixing may
not be a terrible assumption for the spread of a flu virus, but it makes ab-
solutely no sense to imagine HIV-AIDS or any other sexually transmitted
disease spreading randomly. Sexual contacts are not random. People do not
randomly fly to Chicago, have sex with some random person without regard
to gender, and fly home. The lack of randomness in contact structure affects
how the disease spreads.
To say that agents in a complex system are connected in some way should
immediately bring to mind a network. Wood gives networks a great deal
of attention in his paper, and rightly so. Networks provide the foundation
of interaction patterns in any system. They are the channels across which
information, behaviors, and effects travel.
We can also say much more about a system than just notice that it is
connected in some way. If we think of financial institutions, world monetary
systems, international political alliances, or trade partnerships in terms of
networks, then this opens a whole world for study.16 There is a logic to
how these networks are formed that gives rise to their structure, and that
structure has functions. We are then able to ask questions like: Why did a
particular network break apart? Would a different structure be more stable?
To what kinds of shocks was it particularly vulnerable?
Over the past two decades, the field of network science has made tremen-
dous advances on two fronts. First, we are better equipped with tools for
describing and analyzing networks.17 Second, we are getting better at using
16On the world monetary system as a system—and as a network—that lends itself to stability
analysis, see the 2009 report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic and
Financial Surveys Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and
Measuring Systemic Risk (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009).
17See Mark E. J. Newman, Albert László Barabási, and Duncan J. Watts, Structure and
Dynamics of Networks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), and Matthew O. Jackson,
Social and Economic Networks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
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these tools to discover important things about ourselves—for example, that
our health, happiness, and even our tastes in music are influenced consider-
ably by those with whom we interact regularly.18
We now have ways to discover the logic, structure, and function of many
types of networks. Specifically, we can understand the rules by which a net-
work forms, we can characterize its structure, and we can explain functional
attributes of that structure, such as robustness to node failure or the rate at
which diseases or information spread across it. We can use this knowledge
to inform policy decisions, extrapolate lessons from the past, and even af-
fect our own lives. As we will see in a moment, one very powerful way to
change outcomes in our lives is to change the micro-level rules that guide
with whom we interact.19
Networks form when actors interact in some way. People who give each
other business cards form a network of professionals to contact for business
matters. A set of friends who send one another e-mail form a different social
network. Neurons that frequently send signals to one another form neural
networks. How networks form depends on the microrules of the agents in
the network for interaction. An example of a simple microrule is: at a party,
introduce yourself to people randomly. A more complicated rule is: most
of the time, introduce yourself to people who are already talking to people
you know, and only some of the time introduce yourself to random people.
The first rule would produce a random network, which is (not surprisingly)
a network where the connections (or “edges”) between people (“nodes”)
are randomly scattered across the network. The second microrule would
produce what is known as a small world network, where each node has
many local connections and a few random distant ones.20
18On health and happiness see James Fowler and Nicholas A. Christakis, Connected: The
Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives (New York: Little,
Brown, and Company, 2009). On musical tastes, see Matthew J. Salganik, Peter Sheridan
Dodds, and Duncan J. Watts, “Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an
Artificial Cultural Market,” Science (February 10, 2006): 854–56.
19Parents, here’s even more reason to be worried about your children’s friends!
20For a pioneering study of small world networks, see Duncan J. Watts and Steven H.
Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” Nature (June 1998): 440–42.
For a more general treatment, see Duncan J. Watts, Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks
between Order and Randomness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
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Random networks and small world networks are different. They are dif-
ferent in the processes that formed them, as we just saw. They are also
different in how they look, which affects their functionality—i.e., the prop-
erties of the network that we care about. We’ll say more about functionality
in a moment. First, we have a few important points to make about structure
and where it comes from.
Structure is an emergent property of networks. The agent in our example
above did not attend the party in order to contribute to the generation of a
small world network (or so we hope); he or she went to meet new people and
hopefully have a good time. Network science has classified many network
structures and has devised rules by which we can characterize them. In
addition to small world and random networks, other common structures
include power law, hierarchical, and hubs and spokes networks.21
Different types of networks tend to take on different forms. Ground traffic
networks tend to look like random networks, while air travel networks are
hubs and spokes. Most social networks are small world, while academic
citation networks and networks of websites that link to one another are
almost always power law networks. In a power law network, almost all
nodes have very few connections but a handful of nodes have a great many
connections.
The reason these networks look different from each other is due less
to the fact that they have different components and more to the fact that
these different components use different rules, or processes, for connecting
with one another. Humans tend to connect with one another using a rule
of mostly meeting people like themselves, which produces a small world
network. Alternatively, scientific papers that are cited more are more likely
to get still more citations, which means a few papers host the majority of
the citations, and most papers receive fewer than two or three citations.
This process is preferential attachment—or “the more, the more.” If papers
receive citations in proportion to the number of citations they already have,
then this results in a power law. The World Wide Web is also a power
21For an overview of types of networks and their properties, see Albert László Barabási,
Linked: The New Science of Networks (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
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law: websites with more sites linked to them are more likely to receive more
links.
Because structure emerges from these microrules—“pick the one with
the most,” “pick randomly,” or “pick others like you”—this means that
changes in network structure can be brought about by changes in microrules.
Changes in network structure affect the network’s performance—thus finally
bringing us to functionality. We discuss two functionalities, robustness and
speed of diffusion, and explain how each is influenced by structure.
By robustness we specifically mean resiliency in the face of node failure.
How many nodes can be knocked out in a network before the network
splits apart, that is, breaks into two pieces such that one can’t travel from
just any node to any other node? The more node knockouts a network
can sustain without breaking apart, the more robust it is. Here is where
structure matters: networks with power law distributions are robust to ran-
dom attacks, but very fragile to targeted ones (knock out the node with the
most edges and the whole thing crumbles). Random networks, on the other
hand, are robust against targeted attacks, but they are more vulnerable
than power law networks to random knockouts. This type of analysis—
looking at the network structure and asking whether the knockout of a
single node will lead to catastrophic failure—has been used by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund in exploring the stability of the world financial
system.22
Another important functionality is how quickly something, such as a
disease or a new idea, spreads through a population. If we want a new
good idea to spread quickly through a population, then we would like that
population to be connected according to hubs and spokes or a power law. If
we want a disease to spread slowly through a population, we might prefer
a random network or a small world network with very few random long-
distance connections.
From just this brief overview of network theory, we can see implications
for how understanding networks can help us think not just about how net-
works form and what they do, but how we can use them to solve problems
22IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys Global Financial Stability Report.
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and generate positive change. From a policy perspective, it is immediately
clear that changing incentives locally can lead to real global change. If chang-
ing the form of the network can change its functionality, this means it is
possible to shift a system from fragility into robustness, or vice versa, with
just a few changes to local interaction rules. Of course, even this rule need
not always hold: sometimes it may turn out that just a few small changes
in local interaction rules can produce tremendous global changes. Other
times, we might be surprised by how resilient a network is to many changes.
Understanding the properties of networks and the rules that gave rise to
them can help us predict what kinds of interventions will be most effective
to achieve our desired outcomes.
Having just preached the benefits of thinking in terms of networks, we
now offer a word of caution. It is possible to get carried away with network
thinking. Almost any information can be represented as a network. We could
represent each unique word in this article as a node and draw a link between
any two words that appear next to each other in the text. That would
certainly be a network, but it wouldn’t provide much useful information.
Scholars have used networks to analyze how and whether people vote
and what goods they purchase. These studies show that while networks of
friends matter, they do not explain behavior as much as income, ideology,
education, and other variables.23 So, though networks matter, they don’t
always matter that much. As is the case with most methods of scientific
inquiry, knowing when to apply a networks lens to our analysis is at least
as important as knowing how to understand information about a network
once we have it.
A Less Rosy View
The feature of complex systems that most animates Wood seems to be the
robustness of human society—the continuation of the human experiment.
23On the factors that influence voting behavior, see such foundational and influential works
as John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), and V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf,
1964). On purchasing decisions, see, e.g., James R. Bettman, An Information Processing Theory
of Consumer Choice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
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Wood takes a rather rosy view of the potential for complexity thinking.
He envisions a world in which our recognition of complexity results in
a more cooperative global society. That may well be true. And, more to
the point, greater cooperation may be necessary to cope with our growing
complexity. Yet, wishing for cooperation won’t make it so. In addition,
achieving it may be difficult. Finally, complexity thinking actually suggests
that full cooperation is not ideal anyway.
We take up each of these three points: complex systems need not produce
emergent cooperation; controlling complex systems often is not possible;
and, actually, we shouldn’t want full cooperation after all. As for the first
concern, there is no end of models that produce emergent cooperation.24
Cooperation can emerge even with the simplest agent rules. For example,
Axelrod found that a simple rule of reciprocity was sufficient to generate
and sustain cooperation in a community of interacting agents.25 Nowak
and May have shown that, over time, evolutionary pressures on spatially
arranged agents lead to cooperation even in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, a
game in which noncooperative behavior is optimal in the one-shot setting.26
Before we just sit back and wait for the cooperation to come about,
we must keep in mind that complex systems also organize themselves into
undesirable states. Most notably, a substantial body of research suggests that
many systems have organized themselves into critical states. A critical state is
one in which small disturbances can lead to large events, such as earthquakes
or stock market crashes.27 In systems that self-organize to a critical state,
tensions build until the entire system is poised on the verge of collapse. The
potential danger of self-organized criticality warns us against just letting
complex systems run. Recent events in financial markets support this claim.
Despite the risks to just letting systems run, there is abundant evidence of
the benefits from decentralization and bottom-up processes. What then is to
24Robert Axelrod, “On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory,” Analyse & Kritik 22 (2000):
130–151.
25Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
26Martin A. Nowak and Robert M. May, “The Spatial Dilemmas of Evolution,” Interna-
tional Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 3:1 (1993): 35–78.
27See Per Bak, How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality (New York:
Copernicus, 1996).
360
The Complexities of Global Systems History
be done? If decentralization and bottom-up processes are so great, should
we just leave all systems to work themselves out and cross our fingers against
criticality? On the one hand, Wood argues for leaving the Leviathan out of
this. On the other, we think Wood would disagree with a full laissez-faire
policy towards complex systems.
In addition to being “red in tooth and claw,” ecosystems can suffer mass
extinctions.28 For many reasons, few would agree that we should just let
’er rip and see what emerges in ecosystems. Instead, policy makers talk of
ecosystem management.
In social systems, emergent outcomes can be very beneficial. In political
systems, democracy can emerge. And plenty of good things, like innovation
along points of high connectedness, could take place long before we had
any complex systems thinking to explain it. But pervasive inequality, disease
epidemics, and nuclear weapons can also emerge. Wood’s main premise is
that we need better understandings of global history from a complex systems
perspective so that we can intervene and affect outcomes for the better. But
when do we intervene, and when do we let things run their course?
In contemplating interventions from a complexity standpoint, we must
avoid thinking in terms of comparative statics: “the world is in state X
now, and if we choose policy Y, the world will move to state Z.” Such
logic may work in an equilibrium system, but it doesn’t make sense in a
complex system. The same holds for explaining outcomes we already see in
the world. We must instead think in terms of features of the system itself. For
this reason, Axelrod and Cohen advocate trying to harness complexity.29
Policies geared toward harnessing complexity focus on the attributes of
complex systems: diverse agents, connectivity, nonlinear interactions, and
adaptation. We can think of each one of these attributes as a dial, and we can
explore what happens as we turn those dials. As might be expected, as we
turn those dials, we do not see simple linear effects. Taking a system that is
not at all connected and making it more connected typically increases com-
plexity. However, if the system becomes too connected it can collapse into
28See Doug Erwin, Extinction: How Life on Earth Nearly Ended 250 Million Years Ago
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
29See Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complexity.
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stasis. The same is true of the other attributes. No adaptation leads to stasis.
Too much adaptation leads to a random mess.30 Too much interaction leads
to a tangled mess, while too little leads to no complexity. Complexity arises
when the dials for connectedness, diversity, adaptation, and nonlinearity are
set in between the extremes. For this reason, Miller and Page, in their survey
of complex adaptive social systems, describe complexity as the “interesting
in between.”
As discussed above, the phenomena produced by a complex system can
run the gamut—from emergence to phase transitions. Here’s where knowl-
edge and understanding become important. Models of disease transmission
show that there exists a threshold after which a disease outbreak becomes
an epidemic. That threshold depends on levels of connectedness. Turn con-
nectedness up a little and the system might produce a mass epidemic. Dial it
back down and only a few suffer. This implies there is something that can
be done about many systems we care about. Happily, the tools available to
understand them are also undergoing regular improvement.31
The possibility of harnessing complexity by adjusting dials becomes chal-
lenging and may surpass our collective capabilities. This doesn’t mean that
we shouldn’t try—only that we must be realistic in what we hope to achieve.
A fully cooperative world may exceed our powers. Wood is correct that suc-
cess in generating desirable outcomes will require a new reality—a new
way of thinking and behaving.32 But we doubt that this will take the fully
cooperative form that Wood foresees. It will instead be messier and con-
stantly under attack from new ideas. But this is good!
30John Miller and Scott E. Page, Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Computa-
tional Models of Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
31One important tool for analyzing complex systems that Wood doesn’t mention is agent-
based modeling, a computational approach to understanding outcomes in systems of diverse,
connected, interacting, and adaptive agents. Other tools include increasingly sophisticated
software for network analysis, dynamical mathematical models, and genetic algorithms. In
addition to actual physical tools, there have also been tremendous conceptual innovations. Just
a few of the conceptual tools that give us leverage in our challenging complex systems problems
include new ways to measure attributes of complex systems (like connectedness), new ways to
classify different types of adaptation, and new theories of when diversity is helpful (see Page,
Diversity and Complexity).
32For more on the need for new mindsets to understand our world, see also Eric Beinhocker,
The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
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In predicting the lack of a fully cooperative future, we do not want
to be seen as throwing a wet blanket on Wood’s fire. On the contrary,
complexity theory tells us that we would not want full cooperation if we
want a robust global system.33 As Bednar et al. show, system level ro-
bustness requires a balance between exploration and exploitation.34 Thus,
our economic, political, and social institutions must allow for new ideas
and approaches to percolate.35 That means they must permit challenges
to the status quo. Often those challenges will be uncooperative and inef-
ficient. And when that happens, those challenges must be put down. But
other times, challenges to the “cooperative” status quo will reveal new
opportunities or signal calamities. In doing so, they will help to ensure ro-
bustness. In other words, we are going to need to have some conflict in
order to get to new solutions. We have to prepare to disagree—to defend
our ideas while considering others, even if they are starkly different from
our own.
We do not mean to suggest that suicide bombers at the local level preserve
stability at the global level. Far from it, we mean instead to say that what
constitutes a cooperative act in the collective interest depends on an individ-
ual’s model of how the world works.36 In addition, given that no one person
can make complete sense of something as complex as the modern world, any
hope for collective understanding will depend on diverse understandings of
reality.37 And in order to get anywhere with all our diverse understandings—
some of which will be complex systems thinking, and many of which won’t
be—we need not just to accept, but to encourage our differences.
33See Jenna Bednar, Aaron Bramson, Andrea Jones-Rooy, and Scott E. Page, “Emergent
Cultural Signatures and Persistent Diversity: A Model of Conformity and Consistency,” Ra-
tionality and Society (forthcoming, 2010), for a model that produces both differences between
communities and diversity within groups.
34March, “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning.”
35On designing robust institutions that still allow new ideas to percolate and an expansion
of the ideas put forth in this paragraph, see Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
36For more on mental models and the advantages for populations with diverse mental models,
see Scott E. Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms,
Schools, and Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
37See Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule
of the Many (forthcoming).
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We are left with a balancing act. Cooperation requires common under-
standings of what is good. Understanding what is good requires diversity—
and not too much and not too little. Making this all the more challenging,
the appropriate balance may well be contingent on the current state of the
system. At times, we may need to encourage discontent. At others, we may
need to look past our differences and forge agreement. Complex systems
thinking is itself one way of thinking about the world in a wide system pop-
ulated by other ways of thinking. It can offer up lots of solutions to lots of
our problems, but it is not the only way. In fact, it is a matter of our own
survival that it not be the only way.
Conclusion: Where Next?
Where does all of this leave us? We are left with three agendas. First,
the world has become more complex. That should be indisputable. It
follows that complex systems thinking should prove useful to histori-
ans. Having an appropriate set of concepts would seem a prerequisite
for competent historical analysis. So, though we take a more tempered
view, we agree with what Wood has described—that complexity think-
ing is needed to help us tackle our most challenging global problems. At
the same time, for all our work on complex systems, we need to keep in
mind that other ways of thinking are necessary and must simultaneously be
encouraged.
Second, it is not a minor point to say that we need a new mindset. Policy
analysis has long been conducted from the perspective of equilibrium—doing
X creates more Y. Changing our thinking about outcomes from an equilib-
rium standpoint to one that incorporates complexity means more than just
considering that pulling the X lever can have rippling consequences of po-
tentially unexpected magnitudes through a system. It means considering that
the institutions that generate policies in the first place may tend to produce
outcomes that are more or less robust. How can we structure institutions
so they do not produce undesirable large events, like financial crises? For
example, Bednar shows that diverse but complementary institutions in po-
litical systems can simultaneously provide safeguards against massive shock
(due to diversity), but also sustain dynamic performance over time (due to
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complementarity).38 This way, a political system need not be fragile, nor
will it be completely rigid and unchanging.
Third, historical scholarship and complex systems thinking can form a
powerful partnership. For all the new tools and models that have been de-
veloped in recent decades, complex systems thinking is still new compared
to other ways of thinking. There remains a lot of ground yet to be broken.
The currently widely used stylized social science models would be enriched
considerably by careful consideration of history and context.39 For example,
John Padgett and colleagues, in their work on social networks in Renais-
sance Florence, found that the Medici formed networks that were robust to
shocks.40 We ought to take lessons from such findings in the past and in-
corporate them into what we know now about our current, more complex,
social world.
We believe these kinds of historical perspectives on social problems are
key to our understanding of how we got where we are. This is not news
to historians. Still, adding a complex systems perspective may help both
historians and social scientists. Combining historical knowledge of past suc-
cesses, such as in sustainable resource extraction or disease containment,
with complex systems logic should produce very powerful explanations.
These explanations can offer insight on our current global system. As much
as complex systems can help our understanding of the past, so, too, we
believe history can help us understand complex systems. To put it another
way: If we combine complex systems thinking with historical analysis, we
believe the outcome will be greater than the sum of its parts.
38Bednar, The Robust Federation.
39The examples of stylized social science models in Cederman, Emergent Actors in World
Politics, and Lustick, “Agent-Based Modelling of Collective Identity” (see Note 5 above), are
excellent cases where much insight was generated from extremely simple models. Imagine how
far we might get on particular problems if we could embed these in rich context, or adjust the
assumptions with an eye to real cases!
40Christopher Ansell and John Padgett, “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–
1434,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1259–1319. John Padgett’s entire collection
of research on this subject is an excellent case of exactly what we describe in the above footnote
on the value to be gained from deep understanding of context.
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